The Poona Pact and What Went Before It

[On the 80th anniversary of the infamous Poona Pact, we are publishing an edited excerpt from Vishal Mangalwadi’s India: The Grand Experiment that sheds light on the role played by the British rulers, Indian nationalist elites and leaders of India’s “Depressed Classes” in paving – and blocking – the road to social and political emancipation of the Indian masses. – EDITORS]

Many upper-caste Indians believe that the Dalits in India were liberated by the Indian National Congress and Mahatma Gandhi. The fact is that the Congress’ involvement with the plight of the oppressed began only in 1917, and from the beginning Congress’ integrity was doubtful. A sketch of that history is enlightening.

On 20 August 1917, during the First World War, the then Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, made a formal announcement on behalf of the British Government. He declared that his government’s post-war intention for India was to develop “self governing institutions with a view to progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.” The announcement was understood to mean that India would be given the kind of autonomy already enjoyed by Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Indian politicians had been expecting this kind of a declaration and were preparing schemes for changes in the constitutional structure of India that would suit their interests. Two of the schemes that had attracted special attention during 1916–1918 were “the Congress–League scheme” which was based on presidential theory of government and the “Montagu–Chelmsford Plan” which relied on the parliamentary theory of government.

The Congress needed the endorsement of the lower castes to be able to push forward its scheme as the “national demand”. Its problem was that although the Muslim league had approved its proposal, the “depressed classes” did not trust the upper-caste leadership of the Congress. In 1895, some Congress leaders had been willing to allow the leaders of the Social Conference to use its platform to oppose the enslavement of the Indians by the Hindu social order. The idea was dropped when Mr Tilak’s followers threatened to burn down the Congress pandal if anyone dared to oppose Hindu customs from that platform. The “untouchables” retaliated by protesting against the Congress and by burning its effigy. Understandably, their antipathy against the Congress had continued till 1917 when the Congress needed their support.

That distrust made it difficult for the Congress to obtain the endorsement of the backward classes for the Congress–League scheme.. Instead of apologizing for its earlier timidity and indifference, the Congress tried deception to obtain Dalit endorsement for its scheme. It wrote a resolution of its own and used a highly respected figure – Sir Narayan Chandavarkar, the President of the Depressed Classes Mission Society – to get it passed along with other resolutions in a meeting held on 11 November 1917, in Bombay. The highlights of the key resolutions read as follows:

First Resolution affirmed “Loyalty to British Government” and prayed for victory to the Allies in the First World War then going on.

Second Resolution carried at the meeting by an overwhelming majority, the “dissentients being about a dozen,” expressed approval for the scheme of reform in the administration of India recommended by the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League.

Third Resolution carried unanimously said: “… this public meeting of the Depressed Classes strongly feels that in the scheme of reform and reconstitution of the Legislative Councils which Government may be pleased to adopt, due regard be paid to the interest of the said classes. This meeting therefore prays the British Government to be so gracious as to protect those interests by granting to those classes the right to elect their own representatives to the said Councils in proportion to their numbers.”

Fourth Resolution unanimously carried at the meeting was: “That the Government be prayed for the adoption … of a compulsory and free system of education….”

Fifth Resolution also carried unanimously read: “That the Chairman of this public meeting be authorised to request the Indian National Congress to pass at its forthcoming session a distinct and independent resolution declaring to the people of India at large the necessity, justice and righteousness of removing all the disabilities imposed by religion and custom upon the Depressed Classes …. These disabilities, social in origin, amount in law and practice to political mission and propaganda of the Indian National Congress.”

Sixth Resolution prays all Hindus … of the higher castes, who claim political rights, to take steps for the purpose of removing the blot of degradation from the Depressed Classes….”

The Indian National Congress followed up the above-mentioned meeting with its own meeting, and passed the following high-sounding resolution:

“This Congress urges upon the people of India the necessity, justice and righteousness of removing all disabilities imposed by custom upon the Depressed Classes, the disabilities being of a most vexatious and oppressive character, subjecting those classes to considerable hardship and inconvenience.”

A few years later, Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar called the above resolution a “strange event”. The Congress had functioned for 32 years, it had championed the cause of India’s political independence, it had campaigned against the British Raj, but it had never spoken up for the freedom of the lower castes. Now, only when it needed their political support, it found itself speaking up for them – but only to get their vote. Mr Kanshi Ram, the President of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), and Dr. Ambedkar’s de facto successor, described this “deceptive” appeal for justice “mischievous”. … Later events showed that the Congress had no intention of doing anything about the oppressiveness of Hindu society. Nevertheless, the resolution had compelled Congress to admit that the internal atrocities of the Indian society had to be dealt with, as well as the immorality of the alien rule.

A few days after the first meeting in Bombay, the dozen “dissentients” organized another meeting of the lower castes, again in Bombay. It was this meeting that shaped the attitude of Dr Ambedkar and Mr Kanshi Ram towards the upper-caste politicians. Bapuji Namdeo Bagade, a leader of the non-Brahmin party, chaired the meeting. The resolutions passed in this meeting nullified some of the resolutions passed in the first. Following are the key resolutions passed in the second meeting:

(1) Resolution of loyalty to the British Throne.

 (2) That this meeting cannot give its support to the Congress-League scheme in spite of its having been declared to have been passed at the meeting of 11th November 1917 by an overwhelming majority.

(3) That it is the sense of this meeting that the administration of India should be largely under the control of the British till all classes and specially the Depressed Classes, rise up to a condition to effectually participate in the administration of the country.

 (4) That if the British Government have decided to give political concessions to the Indian Public, this meeting prays that Government should grant the Untouchables their own representatives in the various legislative bodies to ensure to them their civil and political rights.

 (5) That this meetings approves of the objects of the Bahiskrit Bharat Samaj (Depressed India Association) and supports the deputation to be sent on its behalf to Mr. Montagu.

 (6) That this meeting prays that Government looking to the special needs of the Depressed Classes, should make primary education both free and compulsory. That the meeting also requests the Government to give special facilities by way of scholarships to the students of the Depressed Classes.

(7) That the meeting authorises the President to forward the above resolutions to the viceroy and the Government of Bombay.

What this meeting said in effect was that the Dalits would rather remain under the British rule, than gain political independence only to be ruled by the Brahmins. As Dr Ambedkar was to put it later in his book Annihilation of Caste, “Swarajya (Independence) has got no significance, without establishing a caste-less society.” This is because he knew from his experience that “Political brutality is nothing when compared with social brutality.”

This sentiment of the lower castes made it imperative for Mahatma Gandhi to work for their “emancipation”.

Dr Ambedkar refuted that claim in his book, What Gandhi and the Congress have done For the Untouchables. He presented the case that even during the struggle for national independence, Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress did all that they could to deceive the lower castes, and to keep them under the control of the upper castes. It is not necessary to restate their case here. An important fact on which the case rests follows:

After Lord Irwin announced in 1929 that the British government would honour the 1917 commitment to give self-rule to India, Round Table Conferences were held in London in 1930–32 to settle the modalities of transfer of power. Leaders of the scheduled castes demanded that, given the fact that the upper castes were not concerned for them, they should be allowed to select their own legislators, so that their representatives would represent their point of view.

Mahatma Gandhi opposed the proposal because he feared that such a scheme would reinforce the walls that already separated the upper- and lower-caste Hindus. His proposal was that certain electorates should be reserved for candidates from the scheduled castes, but that all voters must exercise their franchise to elect the legislator. This way he or she would represent the entire constituency, not just the scheduled castes.

Although Gandhi’s proposal sounded good, it had a problem. It meant that the scheduled-caste candidates would fight amongst themselves, but that the candidate backed by the higher castes would always win. So, any scheduled-caste candidate who wanted to win an election would always need to be subservient to the upper-caste voters. The Round Table Conference failed in resolving the issue, and all participants – including Gandhi – agreed that they would leave the matter to be decided by the British Prime Minister, and that his decision would be accepted by all.

The British Government announced its “Communal Award” in favour of Dr Ambedkar’s proposal on 17 August 1932. Gandhi saw fresh dangers in Dr Ambedkar’s scheme. What if Dr Ambedkar’s Republican Party joined hands with Mr Jinnah’s Muslim League? Together, it would not be difficult for the Muslims and the lower castes to beat the upper-caste Hindus in a battle of numbers. Democracy – the number game – would then be to the disadvantage of the upper castes.

Mahatma Gandhi, therefore, went on his longest ever “fast-unto-death” in Poona (Pune). This was not directed against the Colonial Raj. Dr Ambedkar described its purpose in a statement on 19 September 1932:

“I should have thought that a well-wisher of the Depressed Classes would have fought tooth and nail for securing to them as much political power as might be possible in the new Constitution . . . He not only does not endeavour to augment the scanty political power which the Depressed Classes have got under the Communal Award, but on the contrary he has staked his very life in order to deprive them of little they have got.”

National and international pressure was mounted on Dr Ambedkar to surrender this possibility of freedom and save Gandhi’s life. The upper-caste followers of Mahatma Gandhi threatened dire consequences should he die.  Dr Ambedkar’s statement confirms:

Whether he knows it or not, the Mahatma’s act will result in nothing but terrorism by his followers against Depressed Classes all over the country . . . the Mahatma is releasing reactionary and uncontrollable forces, and is fostering the spirit of hatred between the Hindu Community and the Depressed Classes by resorting to this method and thereby widening the existing gulf between the two.

Dr Ambedkar realized that a large number of the untouchables might be forced to pay with their lives if Mahatma Gandhi died. So to save his life and theirs he surrendered their political power through the “Poona Pact” of 24 September 1932. As a result, during most of the 50 years of Independence the lower castes have had to play second fiddle to the upper caste rulers.

Gandhi succeeded politically, but only in ensuring that the lower castes remain subservient to the upper castes in free India. As Dr Ambedkar put it, the policy of the “Joint Electorate” which Mahatma Gandhi had enforced by staking his life is, “. . . from the point of view of the Hindus to use a familiar phrase a ‘rotten borough’ in which Hindus get the right to nominate an untouchable to sit nominally as a representative of the untouchables but really as a tool of the Hindus.”

In his book India: The Grand Experiment (Pippa Rann Books, Surrey, 1997), Vishal Mangalwadi challenges our official myth that it was Gandhi and his Congress that brought freedom to India. 

                                           (Published in  Forward Press, September, 2012 Issue)
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